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The Broaden-and-Build Theory states that positive emotions broaden cognition and
therefore build personal resources. However, missing theoretical precision regarding the
interaction of the cognitive processes involved offers a variety of possible explanations
for the mechanisms of broadening and building. In Experiment 1 we tested the causality
assumption which states that positive emotions first broaden visual attention which in
turn leads to broadened cognition. We examined the effects of a broadened, narrowed
or neutral attentional scope of 72 subjects (30 men) on their momentary thought-action
repertoire. Results showed that there were no significant differences between groups
regarding the breadth or the content of the thought-action repertoire. In Experiment 2 we
studied the non-causality hypothesis which assumes a non-causal relationship between
cognitive processes. We did so by investigating the effects of negative, neutral, and
positive affect on the visual attentional scope of 85 subjects (41 men) in Experiment 2a,
as well as on the thought-action repertoire of 85 participants (42 men) in Experiment 2b.
Results revealed an attentional broadening effect in Experiment 2a but no differences
between groups concerning the breadth of the thought-action repertoire in Experiment
2b. However, a theory driven content analysis showed that positive affect promoted
social actions. Thus, our results favor the non-causality assumption. Moreover, results
indicate that positive emotions do not target personal resources in general but rather
resources associated with social behavior. In conclusion, we argue that the Broaden-
and-Build Theory should be refined.
Keywords: visual attention, thought-action repertoire, Broaden-and-Build Theory, emotion, cognition
INTRODUCTION
Evolution has not only shaped the human’s body (e.g., Shubin et al., 1991, 1997), but also the
cognitive system (e.g., Aboitiz, 1992; Toupo et al., 2015). Emotions are a good example of how
evolution shaped the cognitive system. They are believed to be “the neurocomputational adaptions
that have evolved in response to the adaptive problem of matching arrays of mechanism activation
to the specific adaptive demands imposed by alternative situations” (Tooby and Cosmides, 2008,
p. 117). Thus, every emotional episode seems to serve a specific function by eliciting predetermined
action tendencies. The fear of being stalked, for instance, prepares the body and the mind to deal
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quickly and efficiently with a potentially life-threatening
situation. It does so by mobilizing all kinds of different programs
such as individual goals, motivational priorities, information-
gathering strategies, perceptual mechanisms, memory, attention,
physiological activation, communication, emotional expressions,
and behavioral tendencies (for a review see Tooby and Cosmides,
2008). However, Fredrickson and Cohn (2008) point out that
the functional adaption model has a bias toward negative
emotions. Action-tendencies elicited by positive emotions tend
to be unspecific. Thus, the adaptive benefit of positive emotions
is currently unclear.
Fredrickson’s (2001) Broaden-and-Build theory provides
a theoretical framework of the adaptive functions positive
emotions may serve. According to the model, positive emotions
broaden cognition and, in turn, lead to broadened momentary
thought-action repertoires. This results, when accumulating, in
the building of intellectual, physical, and social resources. In
other words, as their vision and cognition widen, people see
more possible actions around them, like engaging in meaningful
social conversations, building social bonds etc. Social resources
in turn increase the likelihood of coping more effectively with
adverse situations in the future making it more likely to get help
from other people. Thus, positive emotions unfold their adaptive
benefit over the long run (for a detailed review see Fredrickson,
2001). Furthermore, the Broaden-and-Build Theory predicts that
the building of personal resources increases the frequency of
positive emotional experiences and, therefore, triggers an upward
spiral toward emotional well-being (Fredrickson and Joiner,
2002). Negative emotions have a rather oppositional effect on
cognition and result in narrowed thought-action repertoires or
specific action-tendencies.
In order to put the Broaden-and-Build Theory to empirical
test, Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) conducted two seminal
experiments. In both experiments short film clips were used
to induce either amusement, contentment, a neutral feeling,
anger, or anxiety. Experiment 1 focused on the effects of positive
emotions on the scope of visual attention, measured by a Global–
Local-Visual Processing Task adapted from Kimchi and Palmer
(1982). Participants were asked to decide which of the two figures
below was more similar to the figure above (see Figure 1). If
participants chose the geometrical figure with the same global
configuration, their attentional focus was assumed to be broad.
If they chose the figure with the same local geometrical form,
their attentional focus was assumed to be narrow. In Experiment
2 the thought-action repertoire was measured by a Twenty
Statement Test (TST). Participants were asked to write down all
the actions they would like to do at that moment after having
watched the respective film clip. The TST had exactly twenty
blanks that could have been filled out. Results indicated that
participants experiencing a positive emotion chose the global
geometrical configuration more often in Experiment 1 and wrote
down more actions in Experiment 2 compared to participants
in the neutral condition. Moreover, participants experiencing a
negative emotion wrote down less actions in Experiment 2 than
participants in the neutral or positive condition. Taken together,
results supported the theoretical framework of the Broaden-and-
Build Theory.
FIGURE 1 | Example for a global–local target item used in both
experiments and by Fredrickson and Branigan (2005). Participants had
to indicate which of the two comparison figures below they found more similar
to the standard figure above.
However, there is still missing theoretical precision
regarding how these various cognitive effects relate to one
another (Lyubomirsky, 2000). Fredrickson offers two possible
explanations for the cognitive broadening effect. However, she
deliberately has not contrasted or named them, yet. We will
call these two explanations the non-causality and the causality
assumption. The non-causality assumption presumes that
positive emotions guide a variety of cognitive processes at the
same time, however, causality among these processes is not
established. In Fredrickson’s and Branigan’s (2005, p. 315) own
words this consideration “states that positive emotions broaden
the scopes of attention, cognition, and action, widening the
array of percepts, thoughts, and actions presently in mind.” The
causality assumption instead establishes causality by postulating
broadened attention as a mediator variable and therefore the
essential variable for the cognitive broadening effect (Conway
et al., 2013, p. 18), i.e., positive emotions would no longer be
the crucial variable for broadening cognition and eventually
building resources, but rather a broadened attentional focus.
Consequently, positive emotions would be one out of many
variables alongside, for example, low motivational intensity, as
supposed by Harmon-Jones et al. (2013) that could broaden
attention and foster the building of personal resources in the
long run.
When looking at empirical evidence for the explanation that
positive emotions alter a lot of different cognitive processes at
the same time without one process being causally responsible
for another one, there are contradicting findings regarding the
broadening effect of positive emotions. On the one hand some
studies induced positive emotions and observed broadening
effects, among others, on memory by increasing memory for the
central and peripheral details (Yegiyan and Yonelinas, 2011), on
visual attention shown by longer peripheral fixation time in an
eye tracking experiment (Wadlinger and Isaacowitz, 2006), or
on cognitive flexibility indicated by lower switch costs between
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tasks (Lin et al., 2014). Furthermore, building effects of positive
emotions with regard to three different personal resources could
be observed performing a path analysis of a questionnaire study
conducted among army wives (Dolphin et al., 2015). Thus, when
looking at these studies, positive emotions indeed seem to have
a broadening and building effect. On the other hand, there are
studies that cannot find a cognitive broadening and building
effect of positive emotions and therefore contradict the previously
mentioned studies. Positive emotions did not influence spatial
attention in a spatial pre-cueing paradigm (Tipples and Sharma,
2000) or the scope of attention using a Flanker Task (Finucane
and Whiteman, 2007), for example. An explanation for this can
be found in recent research which indicates that it might not
be the valence of an emotion that leads to a broadening or
narrowing of the attentional focus, but its motivational intensity
(Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2010, 2012; Harmon-Jones et al.,
2012, 2013). Thus, when approach motivation is manipulated
independently of emotional valence, results show that high
motivational intensity accounts for a narrowing of the attentional
scope. A look at the basic experiments by Fredrickson and
Branigan (2005) reveals that only positive emotions low (e.g.,
amusement, contentment) and only negative emotions high in
motivational intensity (e.g., anger, anxiety) were induced. In
contrast to that, pictures of delicious desserts, for example,
induced positive emotions high in approach motivation while
at the same time narrowing the scope of attention (Gable and
Harmon-Jones, 2008). Moreover, another body of research also
supports the Broaden-and-Build Theory. However, at the same
time it indicates that arousal and task characteristics of the
Global–Local-Visual Processing Task might be variables that
could explain the previously mentioned contradicting findings.
Under the umbrella of the affect as information approach Gasper
and Clore (2002) found that participants in happier moods were
more likely to use an accessible global concept than participants
in a sad mood when reproducing a drawing from memory.
Furthermore, in a second experiment they found that participants
in sad moods were more likely to attend to local information in
a Global–Local-Visual Processing Task. Hence, they concluded
that positive affect privileges global, category-level attention more
than negative affect does which goes along with predictions of
the Broaden-and-Build Theory. On the contrary, Fredrickson
and Branigan (2005) assume that global–local tasks measure the
momentary scope of attention and not attention to global or local
features. This assumption is especially debatable when looking at
the origins of the Global–Local-Visual Processing Task grounded
in research on the primacy of holistic processing and Gestaltism
but not on the attentional breadth (Kimchi, 1992). Thus, it is
questionable whether the Global–Local-Visual Processing Task
really measures the momentary attentional scope but rather the
extend of attention to global or local features of a stimulus.
Furthermore, other variables like arousal (Vogt et al., 2008) or
the personal relevance of the presented material (Grol et al., 2014)
should be taken into account when interpreting results regarding
attention. In attentional control, for example, arousal and affect
interact with one another such that low arousing negative affect
produces the best performance in an attentional blink task
whereas high arousing negative affect produces the weakest
performance. However, for positive affect arousal does not impact
the performance at all (Jefferies et al., 2008). This interaction
effect can also be observed in research on memory and emotion.
Greene et al. (2010) found a memory enhancement effect in
positive mood high-arousal and in negative mood low-arousal
states relative to the other emotional states. Hence, the interaction
of valence and arousal seems to be important when trying to
understand the emotional enhancement of memory. Kensinger
and Corkin (2004) even argue that valence and arousal in regard
to emotional memory are processed by distinct neural processes
such that arousal is dependent on an amygdala-hippocampal
network whereas valence is supported by a prefrontal cortex-
hippocampal network. Taken together, these findings do not
necessarily contradict the Broaden-and-Build Theory as a whole,
but rather extend it and take motivational intensity and arousal
into account as well. Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010, p. 11)
delimit arousal and motivational intensity from one another such
that “motivational intensity, or the impetus to act, is related
directly to arousal, but unlike arousal, motivation always has
action implications (even if they are vague).” Hence, empirical
findings show that the Broaden-and-Build Theory’s predictions
are too general and, therefore, should be refined in terms of which
specific state affects which specific cognitive function.
Furthermore, there is a lack of empirical evidence regarding
the explanation assuming causality between attention and the
thought-action repertoire. However, in creativity research, a
relation between trait broad attention and trait creativity has
been postulated (Kasof, 1997; Lin et al., 2013), indicating
potential causality. In line with this theorizing, Fredrickson
(2001) describes that being creative is one part of a broadened
thought-action repertoire. As mentioned earlier, trait breadth
of attention and creative performance seem to relate to one
another (Kasof, 1997; Lin et al., 2013). Memmert (2007)
found in a real world experimental attentional broadening
intervention that instructions that broadened attention improved
creative performance in ball sport games. However, there
are also studies where a broader scope of attention is not
linked to enhanced creative performance (e.g., Healey and
Rucklidge, 2005). Nevertheless, the methodologically most
convincing experiments by Friedman et al. (2003) established
a causal relationship between broadened visual attention and
enhanced creative performance in a divergent thinking task.
This leads to the conclusion that external visual attentional
broadening primes internal conceptual attentional broadening.
Friedman et al. (2003) observed that the induction of a
broad attentional focus enhances creativity. However, some
methodological shortcomings like missing adequate control
conditions or a missing check of the attentional manipulation
hamper interpretation of the results. To sum up, an empirical
basis of the link between positive emotions, attention, and the
thought-action repertoire, is still missing. However, creativity
research supports the assumption of broadened visual attention
improving creative performance since some studies found
increased creativity after broadening attention (Kasof, 1997;
Friedman et al., 2003; Memmert, 2007). Although this research
provides some promising findings, experiments are lacking
proper control conditions.
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Two experiments were conducted to address the raised issues.
In order to make sure that the same concepts as in the
Broaden-and-Build Theory were addressed, we designed both
experiments using a similar methodology as the experiments
reported by Fredrickson and Branigan (2005). Experiment 1
aimed at putting the causality assumption that positive emotions
broaden attention which in turn broadens the thought-action
repertoire to empirical test. In other words, this experiment
tested the direct effects of the attentional scope on the thought-
action repertoire. Although this experiment was conducted
within the framework of the Broaden-and-Build Theory of
positive emotions, emotions were not part of the experiment
since we intended to investigate causal relations among cognitive
processes known to be influenced by emotions. In short, the
main idea was to induce a broad, narrow, or neutral attentional
state and observe its effects on the thought-action repertoire.
Experiment 2 addressed the previously described contradicting
empirical findings regarding the cognitive broadening effect
of positive emotions. We tried to replicate Fredrickson and
Branigan’s (2005) results using a similar methodology, and in
addition performed a theory driven content analysis of the
Twenty Statements Test. In doing so, we tested the previously
mentioned non-causality assumption among cognitive processes.
METHOD AND RESULTS
Experiment 1
Overview
Experiment 1 used a three group between subject design to test
whether the scope of visual attention influences the cognitive
thought-action repertoire. To this end, we employed a Navon
Induction Task adapted from Perfect et al. (2008). For this task,
Navon Letters were used (big letters composed of many small
letters; for an example see Figure 2). Participants either had
to indicate the identity of the big letter which should induce
a broad attentional scope, or they had to indicate the identity
of the small letters which should induce a narrow attentional
scope. Subjects in the control condition did not complete the
induction task. In order to ensure that the attention induction
worked out as intended (manipulation check), participants took
a Global–Local Visual Processing Task adapted from (Dale
and Arnell, 2013, p. 397) which is similar to the tasks used
by Kimchi and Palmer (1982) or Fredrickson and Branigan
(2005). As described previously, participants had to decide
which of the comparison figures, matching either on the global
or local level, was more similar to the standard figure above
(for an item example see Figure 1). The number of global
and local choices indicated the momentary breadth of the
attentional scope. In other words, the more often participants
chose the figure matching on the global level the broader
the momentary attentional scope was. Finally, the thought-
action repertoire was gaged using the TST (Fredrickson and
Branigan, 2005). Participants were asked to complete the
sentence “I would like to . . .” with up to twenty things
they would have liked to do at this moment. In order to
better understand the broadening effect of action urges we
FIGURE 2 | Item example of the Navon Induction Task. Participants
either had to respond to the big letter or to the small letters depending on
experimental condition.
performed a theory driven content analysis of the written
material.
In short, we designed Experiment 1 to test effects of a
broadened or narrowed visual attentional scope on the thought-
action repertoire. We expected the broadening condition to
display a globally biased attentional scope and the narrowing
condition to display a locally biased attentional scope each
compared to the neutral condition. In line with previous research
on creativity (Friedman et al., 2003; Memmert, 2007) participants
in the broadening condition should show a broadened overall
thought-action repertoire score as well as writing down more
social and more resource building actions compared to the
neutral condition (for a detailed description see the Method
section). In contrast, we expected participants in the narrowing
condition to show a narrowed overall thought-action repertoire
score as well as writing down less social and less resource building
actions compared to the neutral condition.
Participants
Data was collected from 79 adults of which five were excluded
due to a depression or anxiety disorder, one because of an
acute migraine attack while testing, and another one due
to misunderstanding the experimental procedure. Thus, the
relevant sample consisted of 72 adults (30 men) aged between 17
and 44 (Mage = 23.3 years, SD = 4.3 years) who had not studied
psychology or worked in the field of psychology. Participants
were randomly assigned to experimental conditions (broadening,
narrowing, neutral) so that each group comprised 24 participants.
Subjects were recruited via e-mail and had normal or corrected
to normal vision. Furthermore, five were ambidextrous, seven
were left-handed, and 70 participants had at least an educational
degree of a German high school diploma. Among all participants
20 vouchers each worth 10€ were raﬄed off 1 month after the
study ended.
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Both studies (Experiments 1 and 2) were conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants gave
their written informed consent and were told that they could
refrain from the study at any point without consequences. The
study protocol was approved by the ethic commission of the
University of Bamberg.
Material
Navon Induction Task
In order to induce a broad or narrow scope of attention
participants completed a computerized version of the Navon
Induction Task adapted from Perfect et al. (2008). Participants
had to respond to 30 Navon Letters generated by one letter on
the local level that was used to form another letter on the global
level (see Figure 2). As local letters F, H, L, P, S, T, or E were
used to build E, F, H, L, or T on the global level. Local and
global letters did never match. The black inked Navon letters
were placed in the middle of a 304-pixel × 228-pixel white
rectangle with the two comprising black inked letters in the
bottom right and left corner (see Figure 2). The Navon Letters
had a height of 2.9 cm and a width of 2.0 cm whereas the
corner letters had a height of 0.8 cm and a width of 0.6 cm.
These stimuli were presented in the center of a 27-inch computer
screen with a dark gray background. Participants were instructed
to respond to the global letters in the broadening condition
and to the local letters in the narrowing condition. Letter to
response key matching was indicated by two small letters in
the right or left corner of the display (see Figure 2). Moreover,
participants kept a constant viewing distance of approximately
70 cm to the computer screen. In total, 30 Navon letters were
presented in a randomized order. The stimuli remained on
the screen until a response was executed. During the Inter-
Stimulus-Interval of 1.0s a small fixation dot was presented.
Correct responses were counterbalanced for the right and left
key. Furthermore, pretesting revealed that time pressure leads
to a narrowing of the momentary attentional scope. Thus,
participants in the broadening condition were told that response
time did not matter, whereas participants in the narrowing
condition were instructed to respond as fast and accurate as
possible. Participants in the control condition did not complete
the task at all. Stimulus presentation for all computerized parts of
Experiments 1 and 2 was controlled using Presentation Version
17.0 software1. Responses were collected with a Cedrus RB 830
response box2.
Global–Local Visual Processing Task
In order to check whether attention manipulation worked out as
intended an adapted computerized version of the Global–Local
Visual Processing Task (Kimchi and Palmer, 1982; Fredrickson
and Branigan, 2005; Dale and Arnell, 2013) was administered to
participants. Over the trials, eight test triads and 16 filler triads
were presented in randomized order. The figures in each test
triad comprised 3–4 small (8 mm × 8 mm) square or triangle
figures on the local level that formed a bigger (19 mm × 19 mm)
square or triangle on the global level. For the previously described
1http://www.neurobs.com
2http://www.cedrus.com
target stimuli, both of the comparison figures in the bottom
left and right corner matched the standard figure in the upper
middle. One of the comparison figures matched the standard
on the global level (the overall shape), and the other one
matched on the local level (the smaller shape; see Figure 1 for
an example). The figures in each filler triad were composed
of 3–4 small (8 mm × 8 mm) circles, squares, triangles, or
crosses (local level) that formed a bigger (19 mm × 19 mm)
square or triangle (global level). In the filler triads, just one
comparison figure matched the standard figure either on the
global or on the local level. The other comparison triad did
not match the standard figure on a local or global level. Triads
were presented on a 304 pixel × 228 pixel white rectangular
background presented in the middle of a 27 inch computer screen
with a dark gray background. Participants were instructed to
choose the comparison figure that seemed more similar to the
standard figure. They indicated their response by pressing the
right or the left key on a two-key button box. Half of the 16
filler triads matched the top figure on the global level whereas the
other half matched the top figure on the local level. Key presses
in response to filler items were counterbalanced for the right
and left key. The more often a participant chose a comparison
figure matching the global configuration of the standard figure,
the broader the attentional scope was assumed to be and vice
versa for the local choices. Since only target items comprised
comparison figures matching on the local and global level, only
responses to the eight target items in each block were used to
assess the momentary scope of attention, i.e., the momentary
scope of attention was measured by counting the number of
global choices to the target items resulting in a global score
ranging from 0 to 8.
Twenty Statement Test (TST)
In order to measure the momentary thought-action repertoire
an adapted version of the TST was employed. Participants
were instructed to write down all the things they would
like to do at the present moment. The paper in front of
them comprised 20 blank lines each beginning with “I would
like to . . .”. The more ideas a participant wrote down the
broader the momentary thought-action repertoire was assumed
to be. Thus, the momentary thought-action repertoire was
measured by counting the numbers of filled in blank lines
resulting in an overall score ranging from 0 to 20. Moreover,
we performed a two dimensional content analysis using two
independent raters unaware of the purpose of the experiment.
Since Fredrickson (2001) underlines the importance of social
actions within other resource building actions, we instructed both
raters to categorize the named action-urges along the sociality
dimension. In the second dimension, the resource dimension,
we chose to look at resource building actions, being part of
the proposed upward spiral of positive emotions, as well as
resource protecting actions being part of the proposed downward
spiral of negative emotions (Fredrickson, 2001). The sociality
dimension consisted of two subcategories best described as social
actions and non-social actions. Social actions were defined as
actions that particularly mention or need by definition at least
another person, like “having dinner with friends” or “talking
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on the phone.” Non-social actions were defined as actions that
did not mention another person being involved, like “having
dinner” or “watching TV.” The resource dimension comprised
three subcategories best described as resource building actions,
resource protecting actions, and indifferent actions. Resource
building actions were defined as actions that are potentially
improving the body’s fitness, intellectual performance, social
bonding, or psychological resilience. Resource protecting actions
were defined as actions that potentially protect physical, social,
psychological, or intellectual resources, like “running away,”
“getting help.” The indifferent subcategory was defined as actions
that could not clearly be classified as belonging to one or the other
resource subcategory, like “smoking a cigarette” or “stop time.”
Interrater reliability calculated by using Pearson correlations was
at least above 0.90 for all subscales.
Procedure
Participants were welcomed and seated inside a noise-canceling
cabin in front of a 27 inch computer screen with a two-keyed
button box in front of them. The cabin that lowered the sound
level (−40 dB) was necessary because Kasof (1997) showed
that the scope of attention and creative performance can be
confounded by surrounding noises. Participants were randomly
assigned to the conditions (broadening, narrowing, and neutral).
First, they completed a Demographic Questionnaire. During a
training phase participants in the broadening and narrowing
condition were first familiarized with the Navon Induction
Task and afterward with the Global–Local Visual Processing
Task. Participants in the neutral condition were just familiarized
with the Global–Local Visual Processing Task. Furthermore,
participants were told to use the button box with both
index fingers. In the broadening and narrowing condition
participants completed the experiment in the following order:
Demographic Questionnaire, Training phase, Navon Induction
Task, Global–Local Visual Processing Task, TST, Global–Local
Visual Processing Task. The neutral condition had almost the
same experimental order except that there was no Navon
Induction Task. We decided to employ the Global–Local Visual
Processing Task twice for two reasons. First, we conducted
the task after the completion of the TST because we wanted
to make sure that participants remained in the induced
state while completing the TST. Second, we measured the
induced state before the TST because we also wanted to
show that the visual attentional broadening effect existent
after completing the TST was not due to the completion of
the TST. The only way to show this, is by conducting two
measurements that do not differ significantly from one another.
After testing, participants were debriefed and were given the
opportunity to sign up for the lottery of 20 vouchers each
worth 10€.
Results
Since we conducted four separate ANOVAs in Experiment 1, we
employed the Bonferroni correction in order to reduce the risk of
false positive results. Thus, the adjusted critical p-value for each
ANOVA was p= 0.0125 in order to maintain an experiment wise
alpha level of α= 0.05.
Mean numbers of global choices in the Global–Local-Visual
Processing Task were administered to a two-way ANOVA for
mixed groups. There was a significant main effect for the factor
GROUP, F(2,69) = 5.91, p = 0.004, ηp = 0.146. Post hoc Tukey
Tests revealed that the broadening condition had significantly
more global choices than the neutral condition, p = 0.027, as
well as significantly more global choices than the narrowing
condition, p = 0.005. The neutral and the narrowing condition
did not differ significantly from one another, p= 0.828 (for means
see Table 1). Furthermore, there was no significant main effect for
the factor TIME, F(2,69) = 3.57, p = 0.063, ηp = 0.049 and no
interaction effect of TIME and GROUP, F(2,69)= 1.34, p= 0.27,
ηp = 0.037.
The mean number of ideas participants wrote down in the TST
were submitted to a one-way ANOVA. There were no significant
differences between the broadening, M = 7.08, SD = 3.95, the
narrowing, M = 6.29, SD = 5.03, and the neutral condition,
M = 5.33, SD = 6.24, F(2,69) < 1. The mean numbers of ideas
participants wrote down coded as social as well as the mean
numbers coded as resource building were analyzed with a one-
way ANOVA. Regarding social actions there were no significant
differences between the broadening, M = 1.13, SD = 1.70, the
narrowing, M = 0.77, SD = 1.27, and the neutral condition,
M = 0.38, SD = 0.752, F(2,69) = 2.06, p = 0.135. Concerning
resource building actions there were no significant differences
between the broadening, M = 6.13, SD = 3.62, the narrowing,
M = 5.68, SD = 4.97, and the neutral condition, M = 4.96,
SD= 4.31, F(2,69) < 1.
Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine effects of
visual attentional broadening and narrowing on the thought-
action repertoire. This was accomplished by inducing a broad
or narrow visual attentional focus and measuring effects
on the thought-action repertoire afterward. Furthermore, the
momentary attentional scope was gaged after the attention
induction and after the thought-action repertoire measurement
to ensure stability of the induced attentional scope. Results
revealed that induction of the attentional scope worked for
the broadening condition, but not for the narrowing condition.
Therefore, results can only be interpreted for the effects of
a broader attentional focus on the momentary thought-action
repertoire. Furthermore, the attentional scope remained stable
throughout the course of the experiment. Hence, results show
that broadening the visual scope of attention has no effects on
the content and the breadth of the momentary thought-action
repertoire.
TABLE 1 | Mean numbers of global choices in the Global–Local Visual
Processing Task for experimental groups and Time of Measurement in
Experiment 1.
Broadening (n = 24) Narrowing (n = 24) Neutral (n = 24)
Time 1 5.04 ± 2.85 2.25 ± 2.55 2.67 ± 2.68
Time 2 4.33 ± 3.16 2.08 ± 2.55 2.58 ± 2.95
Data are presented as means ± SD.
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Experiment 2
Overview
Experiment 2 was designed to examine the non-causality
assumption among cognitive processes by replicating and
extending Fredrickson’s and Branigan’s (2005) studies. Thus, we
collected data in one session administering two experiments as
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) did, however, we used other
film clips and performed a theory driven content analysis of
the TST afterward. Experiment 2a used a three group between
subject design in order to examine effects of negative and positive
emotions on the visual attentional scope. Therefore, participants
watched a short film clip that aimed at inducing negative,
neutral or positive affect. Immediately afterward participants
completed the Global–Local Visual Processing Task that we used
in Experiment 1 (see Figure 1). Thereafter, participants filled
in the Emotion Report Form originally used by Fredrickson
and Branigan (2005) in order to examine if emotion induction
worked as intended. Experiment 2b used a three group between
subject design in order to examine effects of negative and positive
emotions on the thought-action repertoire. Thus, participants
watched a short film clip again, however, not the one they had
watched before. Immediately afterward participants completed
the TST used in Experiment 1 to measure the momentary
thought-action repertoire They were instructed to write down
all actions they would like to do given the emotion induced
in the previous film. Subsequently, the Emotion Report Form
used in Experiment 2a was administered again to check whether
emotion manipulation worked out. Participants performed both
Experiments (2a and 2b) in a randomized order.
We expected the positive film group to show a globally biased
attentional scope and the negative film group to show a locally
biased attentional scope each compared to the neutral condition.
Experiment 2b examined the effects of negative and positive
affect on the momentary thought-action repertoire. In line with
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) we expected the positive film
group to write down more overall action urges compared to the
neutral film group and the negative film group to write down
less overall action urges compared to the neutral film group.
Additionally, regarding the content analysis, we expected the
positive film group to write down more social actions and more
potentially resource building actions compared to the neutral film
group. In contrast, the negative film group was expected to name
less social actions and more resource protecting actions than the
neutral film group.
Participants
Data was collected from 96 adults that did not take part in the
first experiment. Data of three participants had to be excluded
due to a depression disorder in both experiments. In Experiment
2a three participants were excluded from analysis due to data
collection errors, and another five participants had to be excluded
since emotion induction did not work for them as intended. Thus,
the remaining sample in Experiment 2a consisted of 85 adults (41
men) aged between 18 and 31 (Mage = 21.9 years, SD= 2.9 years).
Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions
so that the negative film group comprised 28 participants,
the neutral film group 30, and the positive film group 27. In
Experiment 2b eight participants were excluded because emotion
induction did not work. Thus, the relevant sample in Experiment
2b consisted of 85 adults (42 men) aged between 18 and 31
(Mage = 22.1 years, SD = 3.0 years). Participants were randomly
assigned to experimental conditions so that the negative film
group comprised 28 participants, the neutral film group 28, and
the positive film group 29. For both experiments all subjects
were recruited via e-mail and had normal or corrected to normal
vision. Furthermore, eleven were left-handed and all participants
had at least an educational degree of a German high school
diploma. All participants either received course credit or 5€.
Material
Emotional film clips
In order to induce negative, neutral, or positive emotions
participants watched a short film clip. For inducing negative
affect, we showed a film clip called “lights out” (2 min 33 s) in
which a woman wants to go to bed but keeps seeing shadows
when switching off the lights. She gets more and more afraid
reaching the film clip’s climax at the very end finishing with a
disgusting shock moment. In the neutral experimental condition,
we used a film clip called “Presentation” (3 min 11 s) in which a
man summarizes the newest features of a presentation software.
Lastly, for inducing positive affect we utilized a film clip called
“laughing baby” (2 min) in which a toddler keeps laughing at his
father who is ripping a sheet of paper into pieces.
In order to gain further insight into the films’ characteristics,
21 adults not taking part in the main experiment rated the extend
of positive feelings, negative feelings, and arousal experienced
during each individual film clip immediately after watching it.
Ratings on each of the three dimensions ranged from “not at all”
to “very much” on a 7-point Likert scale.
Mean scores of negative affect, positive affect, and arousal
ratings were each subjected to a one-way repeated measures
ANOVA with the factor FILM. Analyzing positive affect ratings
resulted in/showed a significant main effect, F(2,40) = 47.8,
p < 0.001, ηp = 0.71. Post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed
that the positive film group, M = 5.43, SD = 1.36, showed
significantly more positive affect than the neutral film group,
M = 2.43, SD = 1.47, p < 0.001, as well as significantly more
positive affect than the negative film group, M = 2.14, SD= 1.28,
p < 0.001. Looking at the negative affect ratings there was a
significant main effect, F(2,40)= 56.7, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.74. Post
hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the negative film group,
M = 5.19, SD = 1.44, showed significantly more negative affect
than the neutral film group, M = 2.57, SD = 1.43, p < 0.001, as
well as significantly more negative affect than the positive film
group, M = 1.52, SD = 1.12, p < 0.001. The neutral and the
positive film group also differed significantly from one another,
p = 0.002. Arousal ratings also displayed a significant main
effect, F(2,40) = 43.3, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.68. Post hoc pairwise
comparisons revealed that the negative film group, M = 4.76,
SD = 1.84, reported significantly more arousal than the neutral
film group, M = 1.48, SD = 0.81, p < 0.001 and the positive film
group, M = 2.19, SD = 1.29, p < 0.001. However, the neutral
and the positive film group did not differ significantly from one
another, p= 0.11.
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Taken together, these findings imply that main effects of
valence cannot be interpreted for negative affect but for positive
affect only as the neutral film differed significantly from the
negative film with regard to arousal ratings but not from the
positive film.
Emotion Report Form
Subjective experiences of certain emotions were assessed using
a German translation of the Emotion Report Form adapted
from Fredrickson and Branigan (2005). Participants were asked
to rate each emotion (amusement, anger, anxiety, contentment,
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and serenity) on a 9-point Likert
scale (0 = none, 8 = a great deal) with regard to the extent
of feeling that particular emotion while watching the film clip.
Furthermore, ratings for amusement, contentment, happiness,
and serenity were combined resulting in the overall positive affect
scale, as well as anger, anxiety, disgust, fear, and sadness resulting
in the overall negative affect scale.
In Experiment 2b, the momentary thought-action repertoire
was assessed using the previously described Twenty-Statement-
Test. However, we changed the instructions and used a German
translation of the instructions Fredrickson and Branigan (2005)
gave their participants. First, after viewing the film but before
completing the Twenty-Statement-Test we asked participants to
describe in one or two words the strongest emotion felt while
watching the film. Afterward we told participants to step away
from the details of the film and
“... take a moment to imagine being in a situation yourself in
which this particular emotion would arise (the one you wrote on the
previous page). Concentrate on all the emotion you would feel and
live it as vividly and as deeply as possible. Given this feeling, please
list all the things you would like to do right now.” (Fredrickson and
Branigan, 2005, p. 320).
Scoring was conducted as described in the methods section of
Experiment l.
Procedure
Participants were welcomed, filled out a demographic
questionnaire and provided their informed consent at the
beginning of the testing session. Then they were seated in a well-
lit room in front of a 27-inch computer screen and were asked
to remain in a stable viewing distance of approximately 70 cm.
Participants were instructed only to use their two index fingers
for responding with the two keyed button box in front of them. In
addition, participants put on noise-canceling headphones. They
were asked to keep the headphones on until the testing session
ended in order to control for distracting noises. Afterward
participants completed Experiments 2a and 2b. While these fully
computerized testing sessions the experimenter left the lab in
order to counteract social desirable responses as well as possible
distraction effects produced by the experimenter. In Experiment
2a there were three possible film clips. Thereafter, in Experiment
2b there were only two possible film clips since we did not
want participants to watch the same film clip twice. When also
counterbalancing the order of Experiments 2a and 2b this results
in 3× 2× 2= 12 possible orders. In Experiment 2a, participants
were familiarized with the Global–Local-Visual Processing
Task practicing on two local and two global fillers which were
presented in a randomized order. Second, participants watched
the assigned film clip and completed the Global–Local-Visual
Processing Task immediately afterward. Then participants were
asked to fill in the Emotion Report Form. After a short break
participants continued with Experiment 2b or vice versa. In
Experiment 2b, participants watched the assigned film clip and
completed the Twenty-Statement-Test immediately afterward.
As a final step participants were instructed to fill in the Emotion
Report Form. After testing, participants were debriefed and
either received course credit or 5€ for participation.
Results
Experiment 2a
Since we conducted two separate ANOVAS in Experiment 2a, we
employed the Bonferroni correction in order to reduce the risk of
false positive results. Thus, the adjusted critical p-value for each
ANOVA was p = 0.025 in order to maintain an experiment wise
alpha level of α= 0.05.
Manipulation check. In order to check whether emotion
induction worked as intended in Experiment 2a mean scores of
the negative affect scale as well as mean scores of the positive
affect scale were both submitted to a one-way ANOVA with the
factor FILM. The Levene’s test indicated that the assumption
of homogeneity of variance was violated for the ANOVA
comparing means of the positive affect scale, F(2,82) = 4.17,
p = 0.019, as well as for the ANOVA comparing means of the
negative affect scale, F(2,82) = 24.33, p < 0.001; therefore,
the Brown-Forsythe F-ratios are reported for both ANOVAs.
Analyzing the positive affect scale there was a significant main
effect, F(2,74.05) = 111.28, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.726 (for means see
Table 2). Post hoc Gabriel Tests revealed that the positive film
group showed significantly more positive affect than the neutral
film group, p < 0.001, as well as significantly more positive affect
than the negative film group, p < 0.001. The neutral film group
displayed significantly more positive affect than the negative film
group, p < 0.001. Looking at the negative affect scale there was a
significant main effect, F(2,30.8) = 121.4, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.750
(for means see Table 2). Post hoc Gabriel Tests revealed that the
negative film group showed significantly more negative affect
than the neutral film group, p < 0.001, as well as significantly
more negative affect than the positive film group, p < 0.001. The
neutral and the positive film groups did not differ significantly
from one another, p= 0.98.
Global–Local-Visual Processing Task. In order to examine the
effects of emotions on the attentional scope, mean numbers
TABLE 2 | Mean positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) scores of the
Emotion Report Form for all three experimental conditions in
Experiment 2a.
Negative film (n = 28) Neutral film (n = 30) Positive film (n = 27)
PA 1.31 ± 1.36 3.78 ± 1.51 6.45 ± 0.89
NA 3.35 ± 1.50 0.17 ± 0.37 0.09 ± 0.10
Data are presented as means ± SD.
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of global choices in the Global–Local-Visual Processing Task
were subjected to a one-way ANOVA with the factor FILM.
Since the Levene’s Test, F(2,82) = 4.35, p = 0.016, revealed
that homogeneity of variances was violated, the Brown-Forsythe
F-ratio is reported. There was a significant main effect for
the factor FILM indicating differences between the positive,
M = 3.33, SD = 2.87, the neutral film, M = 1.67, SD = 2.29, and
the negative film group, M = 1.36, SD = 1.83, F(2,70.5) = 5.52,
p= 0.006, ηp = 0.12 (see Table 3). Post hoc Gabriel Tests revealed
that the positive film group had significantly more global choices
than the neutral film group, p = 0.028, as well as significantly
more global choices than the negative film group, p = 0.008. The
neutral and the negative film group did not differ significantly
from one another, p= 0.944.
Experiment 2b
As we conducted six separate ANOVAs in Experiment 2b, we
employed the Bonferroni correction in order to reduce the risk of
false positive results. Thus, the adjusted critical p-value for each
ANOVA was p = 0.008 in order to maintain an experiment wise
alpha level of α= 0.05.
Manipulation check. In order to test whether emotion induction
worked as intended in Experiment 2b mean scores of the negative
affect scale as well as mean scores of the positive affect scale
were both subjected to a one-way ANOVA with the factor FILM.
The Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity
of variance was violated for the ANOVA comparing means of
the positive affect scale, F(2,82) = 5.4, p = 0.006 as well as
for the ANOVA comparing means of the negative affect scale,
F(2,82)= 21.4, p < 0.001; therefore, the Brown-Forsythe F-ratios
are reported for both ANOVAs. Analyzing the positive affect
scale there was a significant main effect, F(2,69.6) = 132.0,
p < 0.001, ηp = 0.76 (for means see Table 4). Post hoc Gabriel
Tests revealed that the positive film group showed significantly
more positive affect than the neutral film group, p < 0.001, as
well as significantly more positive affect than the negative film
group, p < 0.001. Moreover, the neutral film group displayed
significantly more positive affect than the negative film group,
p < 0.001. Looking at the negative affect scale there was a
significant main effect, F(2,43.4) = 160.6, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.79
(for means see Table 4). Post hoc Gabriel Tests revealed that
the negative film group showed significantly more negative affect
TABLE 3 | Mean numbers of global choices (Global) in the Global–Local
Visual Processing Task for experimental groups in Experiment 2a and
mean numbers of named resource building (Building), social (Social), and
resource protecting actions (Protecting) in the Twenty Statement Test
(TST) for experimental groups in Experiment 2b.
Negative film
(n = 28)
Neutral film
(n = 30)
Positive film
(n = 27)
Global 1.36 ± 1.83 1.67 ± 2.29 3.33 ± 2.87
Building 2.86 ± 2.29 6.89 ± 3.08 7.86 ± 4.52
Social 1.50 ± 1.00 1.00 ± 0.86 3.28 ± 2.58
Protecting 4.04 ± 2.65 0.21 ± 0.79 0.14 ± 0.44
Data are presented as means ± SD.
than the neutral film group, p < 0.001, as well as significantly
more negative affect than the positive film group, p < 0.001.
However, the neutral and the positive film group did not differ
significantly from one another, p= 0.67.
Twenty-Statement Test. To examine whether there was a
broadening of the thought-action repertoire the mean numbers
of ideas participants wrote down in the Twenty-Statement Test
were analyzed by means of a one-way ANOVA. There were
no significant differences between the positive film, M = 8.10,
SD = 4.49, the neutral film, M = 7.68, SD = 2.97, and the
negative film group, M = 6.96, SD = 2.37, F(2,82) < 1.
Concerning resource building actions there was a significant
difference between the positive, M = 7.86, SD = 4.52, the
neutral film, M = 6.89, SD = 3.08, and the negative film group,
M = 2.86, SD = 2.29, F(2,82) = 54.4, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.291
(see Table 3). Post hoc Tukey Tests revealed that the negative
film group named significantly less resource building actions
than the positive film group, p < 0.001, as well as significantly
less than the neutral film group, p < 0.001. However, the
neutral and the positive film group did not differ significantly
from one another, p = 0.539. Since the Levene’s Test showed
that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was not
met for the mean number of social actions, F(2,82) = 6.11,
p = 0.003, and the mean numbers of resource protecting
actions, F(2,82) = 31.13, p < 0.001, Brown-Forsythe F-ratios
are reported. Regarding social actions there was a significant
differences between the positive, M = 3.28, SD = 2.58, the
neutral film, M = 1.0, SD = 0.86, and the negative film
group, M = 1.5, SD = 1.0, F(2,43.3) = 14.8, p < 0.001,
ηp = 0.260 (see Table 3). Post hoc Gabriel Tests revealed that
the positive film group named significantly more social actions
than the neutral film group, p < 0.001, as well as significantly
more social actions than the negative film group, p < 0.001.
The negative and neutral film group, however, did not differ
significantly from one another, p = 0.61. Looking at resources
protecting actions there was a significant difference between the
positive, M = 0.14, SD = 0.44, the neutral film, M = 0.21,
SD = 0.79, and the negative film group, M = 4.04, SD = 2.65,
F(2,33.3) = 53.5, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.57 (see Table 3). Post
hoc Gabriel Tests showed that the negative film group named
significantly more resource protecting actions than the positive
film group, p < 0.001, as well as more resource protecting actions
than the neutral film group, p < 0.001. However, the neutral
and the positive film group did not differ significantly from one
another, p= 0.997.
TABLE 4 | Mean positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) scores of the
Emotion Report Form for all three experimental conditions in
Experiment 2b.
Negative film
(n = 29)
Neutral film
(n = 30)
Positive film
(n = 26)
PA 1.20 ± 1.21 3.58 ± 1.56 6.53 ± 0.78
NA 3.73 ± 1.31 0.33 ± 0.70 0.10 ± 0.15
Data are presented as means ± SD.
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Discussion
The purpose of Experiments 2a and 2b was to replicate
Fredrickson’s and Branigan’s (2005) findings to provide further
evidence for the non-causality assumption. Thus, Experiment
2a examined effects of positive and negative affect on the
visual attentional scope and Experiment 2b looked at effects of
positive and negative affect on the thought-action repertoire. We
found a visual attentional broadening effect of positive affect
in Experiment 2a, but not a visual attentional narrowing effect
of negative affect. Hence, positive emotions seem to broaden
the visual attentional scope. However, the affect did neither
have a broadening nor a narrowing effect on the thought-action
repertoire in Experiment 2b which contradicts the Broaden-and-
Build Theory concerning the respective part of the theory. This
becomes even more evident when looking at the content analysis
of the thought-action repertoire: participants in the positive affect
condition did not name significantly more potentially resource
building actions than participants in the neutral affect condition.
But still, we got some promising findings which may shed some
light on the adaptive function of positive emotions. Participants
in the positive affect condition named significantly more social
actions than those in both other conditions which leads us to
the conclusion that positive emotions’ main function is to make
social bonding and interactions more likely. Thus, emotions
indeed seem to have a behavior guiding function according to
the content analysis. Moreover, as the negative film differed
significantly in valence and arousal ratings from the neutral film,
we are cautious in interpreting results of negative affect in the
section “Discussion” since affect and arousal are confounded in
the negative film group.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We conducted two experiments in order to examine two
contradicting key assumptions within the framework of the
Broaden-and-Build Theory (Fredrickson, 2001). In Experiment
1 we tested the causality assumption which assumes broadened
visual attention to be a mediator variable between positive affect
and the thought-action repertoire. We did so by comparing
the number and the content of named action urges between
groups with a broad, neutral, and narrow visual attentional scope.
Results revealed that there were no differences between groups
regarding the number and the content of named action urges.
Hence, these results challenge Conway et al.’s (2013) causality
assumption. In Experiment 2 we tested the non-causality
assumption which assumes positive emotions to affect a number
of different cognitive processes without specifying the relations
and interactions among those. We did so by replicating and
extending Fredrickson and Branigan’s (2005) original findings.
In Experiment 2a we examined effects of positive, neutral, and
negative affect on the visual attentional scope. Results indicated
a visual attentional broadening effect of positive emotions. In
Experiment 2b we investigated effects of positive, neutral, and
negative affect on the thought-action repertoire. Results showed
that there were no differences between groups regarding the
number of named action urges. Furthermore, participants in the
positive affect condition did not name more potentially resource
building actions compared to the neutral affect condition. Thus,
these results support the attentional broadening part and at
the same time challenge the resource building part of the
Broaden-and-Build Theory. However, the results obtained from
the theory driven content analysis of the Twenty-Statement-
Test point to a guiding function of positive affect, which seems
to promote social action urges. Thus, these findings provide
initial evidence that the ambit of the Broaden-and-Build Theory
is too general and should, therefore, be specified. Finally, it is
important to note that main effects of valence in our study can
only be interpreted for positive affect since the negative film
differed significantly in the arousal dimension from both other
films.
There is additional empirical evidence for the broadening
effect of positive emotions supporting our findings (Wadlinger
and Isaacowitz, 2006; Johnson et al., 2010; Yegiyan and
Yonelinas, 2011; Uddenberg and Shim, 2015). For example,
a recent meta-analysis by Pool et al. (2016) found a general
global attentional bias (Hedges’ g = 0.258) for positive emotions
especially in tasks that included early attentional processing
and stimuli of personal relevance. Furthermore, other studies
go along with our results, thus, leading to the conclusion that
positive emotions do seem to broaden the attentional focus.
There is also empirical evidence concerning our finding that
positive emotions promote social action urges, however, the
empirical basis is not as strong either. There are studies which
find that positive emotions predicted increased social support
(Schiffrin and Falkenstern, 2012; Lin, 2015) or prosocial behavior
(Andreychik and Migliaccio, 2015; Cavanaugh et al., 2015; Rand
et al., 2015). Hence, keeping this relatively small empirical basis in
mind, results concerning the endorsement of social action urges
by positive emotions have to be interpreted with caution, too.
What are the implications of our results for the Broaden-and-
Build Theory? We found positive emotions and not broadened
visual attention to guide the content of the thought-action
repertoire. A mere manipulation of the visual attentional scope
did not lead to the same effect. However, positive affect did
influence the visual attentional scope as well as the thought-
action repertoire at the same time. Nevertheless, it did not do
so in a sequentially mechanistic way, as Conway et al. (2013,
p. 18) assume, but rather in a more complex way. Thus, our
data clearly favor the non-causality assumption over the causality
assumption. Still, the non-causality assumption is far away from
being specific. This means future studies need to further explore
how the different cognitive processes might interact with one
another in order to lead to the proposed resource building
outcome. However, when looking at our data we do not see a
difference in the number of potentially resource building actions
between the positive and the neutral film condition. Thus, it
seems questionable whether positive emotions really endorse
resource building actions more than neutral mental states do.
Looking out for potentially resource building actions could rather
be a usually active mental function that could be inhibited
under particular circumstances. This goes along with the quartet
theory of human emotions (Koelsch et al., 2015) which links
the amygdala to this kind of activation-inhibition phenomenon.
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In short, normally engaging in potentially resource building
actions, while inhibiting this kind of behavior, e.g., only in high
arousing dangerous situations, would be far more adaptive than
just engaging in resource building actions after experiencing a
positive emotion. Hence, our data do not support the assumption
that the evolutionary adapted function of positive emotions is the
building of general personal resources, but rather point toward
an increase of social action urges. In turn, this would mean
that positive emotions prepare our cognitive system to be social
and to connect to other people resulting in enhanced everyday
prosocial behavior (e.g., Andreychik and Migliaccio, 2015).
This could explain the adaptive benefit of positive emotions
since prosocial behavior within-groups increases their members’
survival chances (Boyd and Richerson, 2009).
As we have pointed out before, the above described
conclusions have to be treated carefully due to the relatively small
empirical basis and some limitations to our experiments we will
address now. First, in Experiment 2 we just had one film clip
for each addressed emotional state. Hence, the observed effects
could be due to particular attributes of the presented films and
not positive and negative affect in general. We could show, for
example, that the negative film differed significantly in the arousal
dimension which limits interpretability of results produced by the
negative condition. Future experiments should use different film
clips and replicate our findings. Furthermore, all combinations
of high and low arousal as well as positive and negative valence
should be covered by the used stimuli. This would result in
a more detailed picture of arousal valence interaction effects.
Second, we just used the Global–Local Visual Processing Task
to measure the momentary attentional scope. However, it has
to be mentioned that methods for measuring the breadth of the
attentional scope are reliable, but not related to each other (Dale
and Arnell, 2013). Therefore, other measures of the attentional
scope could have resulted in a different outcome. This could
mean that the observed attentional effects could be due to
methodological issues. Future experiments should also measure
the visual attentional scope using other methods like Navon
letters (Dale and Arnell, 2013) or EEG measures (Vanlessen et al.,
2013).
In our opinion, future research should work on making
the Broaden-and-Build Theory more precise regarding how
the involved cognitive processes interact with one another as
well as which resource components are mainly addressed by
positive emotions. We solved the question whether broadened
visual attention is responsible for the alternation of the thought-
action repertoire. However, we still do not know how positive
emotions alter the thought-action repertoire. Future experiments
could address this problem by examining effects of emotions
on a neurocomputational level. However, a theory from which
precise hypotheses could be derived is unfortunately still missing.
Another important issue that should be addressed in future
research is our postulation that healthy individuals are normally
engaging in resource building actions unless this function is
inhibited. Solving this matter is of a central importance to the
ambit of the Broaden-and-Build Theory since Fredrickson and
Branigan (2005) state that positive emotions lead to the building
of more personal resources than other neutral mental states do.
On the basis of the present empirical findings, we conclude
that specifying the interactions of the various cognitive processes
influenced by positive affective states is a fruitful avenue for future
theorizing and empirical research on the Broaden-and-Build
Theory.
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